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Collecting to the Core — International Relations
by Jeremy Darrington  (Politics Librarian, Princeton University; Political Science Editor, Resources for College Libraries)  
<jdarring@princeton.edu>
Column Editor:  Anne Doherty  (Resources for College Libraries Project Editor, CHOICE/ACRL)  <adoherty@ala-choice.org>
Column Editor’s Note:  The “Collecting 
to the Core” column highlights monographic 
works that are essential to the academic li-
brary within a particular discipline, inspired 
by the Resources for College Libraries bib-
liography (online at http://www.rclweb.net). 
In each essay, subject specialists introduce 
and explain the classic titles and topics that 
continue to remain relevant to the undergrad-
uate curriculum and library collection.  Dis-
ciplinary trends may shift, but some classics 
never go out of style. — AD
For most of its history, the predominant concern of the study of international relations (IR) has been to analyze and 
explain the nature of the international system 
of states and their interactions, particularly 
why states frequently engage in violent con-
flicts and war.  The field of IR has produced 
many ambitious attempts at building theories 
to explain these interactions, and the debate 
has been vigorous and wide-ranging.  While 
the literature of IR theory is voluminous, two 
seminal works by Kenneth Waltz stand out as 
classics that belong in every political science 
collection.  Waltz’s 1959 Man, the State, and 
War and his Theory of International Politics, 
written two decades later, had a profound 
impact on the subsequent scholarship of IR.1-2 
Waltz’s arguments were concise and forceful 
and strongly shaped the contours of the debate 
in IR for more than two decades, influencing 
a generation of IR scholars.  These works 
continue to occupy a prominent place in most 
introductory IR courses.
In Man, the State, and War, Waltz pio-
neered the application of “levels of analysis” in 
explaining the causes of war and international 
relations more generally.  Waltz posited that 
explanations of war could be grouped at three 
distinct levels or “images,” as he called them. 
“First image” explanations of war focus on 
human nature and individual psychology. 
Explanations at this level argue that war is a 
result of human selfishness, greed, evil, miscal-
culation, or other individual factors.  “Second 
image” theories look instead to the internal 
structure of states to explain war.  For example, 
wars may be caused by despotic or imperialist 
states looking to expand their territory, by states 
attempting to overcome internal strife by unit-
ing against an external enemy, or by domestic 
political pressures that may make it costly for 
states to pursue peaceful diplomatic solutions. 
Without dismissing the contributions of 
explanations at these levels, Waltz forcefully 
argued that they were incomplete without a 
consideration of the international environment 
in which states operate, his “third image.”  For 
Waltz, states exist in an anarchic international 
system.  It is anarchic, because there is no uni-
versal government to enforce a system of law 
or compel obedience to a set of shared rules or 
norms of behavior.  In this Hobbesian state of 
nature, each sovereign state is forced to rely 
on its own power and capabilities to secure its 
interests.  In a system of many sovereign states 
with competing interests, conflict leading to 
war becomes inevitable, because there is no 
global authority to prevent some states from 
using force to achieve their aims.  Since the 
preeminent desire of all states is to ensure 
their own survival, all states must account for 
this existential threat and prepare accordingly.
Of course, this insight was not new. In ex-
plaining the origins of the Peloponnesian War, 
Thucydides argued more than 2,000 years ago 
that the “growth of the power of Athens, and the 
alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war 
inevitable.”3  Howev-
er, Waltz’s point was 
precisely that anarchy 
is the most important 
and enduring feature 
of the international 
system, and he traced 
attention to its conse-
quences through the 




seau, Machiavelli, and Clausewitz.  The first 
and second levels of analysis can explain the 
forces driving states’ interests and policies, but 
without considering the effect of international 
anarchy, “it is impossible to assess their impor-
tance or predict their results.”4  Furthermore, 
failing to consider the international environ-
ment leads to erroneous conclusions about 
preventing war, essentially saying “To end war, 
improve men; or: To end war, improve states.”5 
However, as long as there is the possibility that 
some men or states may not improve and will 
choose to resort to force to accomplish their 
goals, all states will be forced to consider war 
as an option to ensure their survival. 
In Theory of International Politics, Waltz 
extended this argument into a more ambitious 
attempt at theorizing the major patterns of 
international politics.  Waltz sought to explain 
various “laws” of state behavior by formulating 
explanatory theories rooted in the structure of 
the international system.  Much of Waltz’s 
argument revolved around defining the con-
cepts of system and structure and showing the 
necessity for systemic theories in explaining 
international relations.  Waltz defined a system 
as a set of interacting units or parts (in this 
case states) and a structure, which he defined 
as a set of conditions or forces that limit the 
variety of behaviors and outcomes that occur 
in the system.  In social and political systems, 
structure constrains behavior indirectly through 
processes of socialization and competition 
among the units.  As the units independently 
act and react to one another in a shared envi-
ronment, their interactions generate pressures 
that promote a similarity of behaviors and 
outcomes — for example, individuals may be 
ostracized for violating group norms or firms 
may go bankrupt if they fail to emulate the 
practices of successful competitors. 
Structures thus define the arrangement 
of the units and their relation to each other 
in the system.  In the international system, 
Waltz argued, three key elements define this 
structure.  First, the organization of the units is 
decentralized and anarchic; in the absence of 
a central authority “whether those units live, 
prosper, or die depends on their own efforts.”6 
Second, the principal units of the system are 
states, which are func-
tionally similar, even 
though their interests 
and capabilities differ 
widely.  States are not 
the only actors that 
matter in international 
politics, Waltz argues, 
but they are the major 
ones, and it is their 
interactions that drive 
the structural dynam-
ics of the international 
system.  Third, the structure is defined by how 
power is distributed across the units in the sys-
tem.  Changes in the number of great powers 
(e.g., a change from a bipolar to a multipolar 
system) will change our expectations about 
state behavior and the outcomes of internation-
al interactions.  For Waltz, the structure of the 
anarchic international system produces regular 
patterns of behavior: to ensure their survival, 
states will seek to maximize their power and 
will seek to counter the rise of potential aggres-
sors or hegemonic states, leading to a balance 
of power in the system.
Waltz’s work formed the basis for what 
came to be known in IR as structural realism or 
neorealism.  His emphasis on structural forces 
shaping state behavior thus distinguished his 
work from the classical realist tradition in IR. 
This tradition — exemplified by Hans Mor-
genthau’s classic Politics among Nations, first 
published in 1948 — was also concerned with 
anarchy and state power, but it traced the source 
of power politics in the international realm to 
the fundamental role of human nature.7  “Hu-
man nature, in which the laws of politics have 
their roots, has not changed” since antiquity, 
Morgenthau declared, and “the tendency to 
dominate, in particular, is an element of all 
human associations.”8  Furthermore, while so-
ciety “restrains aspirations for individual power 
within the national community,” it “encourages 
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and glorifies the tendencies of the great mass 
of the population, frustrated in its individual 
power drives, to identify itself with the nation’s 
struggle for power on the international scene.”9
In contrast, Waltz’s structural realism was 
able to explain recurrent patterns of interna-
tional outcomes without the need to assume 
a universal lust for power or to examine the 
character of individual states.  The structure 
of the international system “constrains [states] 
from some actions [and] disposes them toward 
others.”10  To take a current example, in Waltz’s 
theoretical framework, Iran’s drive for nuclear 
weapons is not the irrational policy of “mad 
mullahs” belonging to an “axis of evil,” but 
rather an attempt to assuage its own security 
fears.  “In no other region of the world does 
a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist.  It is 
Israel’s nuclear arsenal, not Iran’s desire for 
one, that has contributed most to the current 
crisis.”11  Waltz argues that letting Iran get 
the bomb would produce stability, because “by 
reducing imbalances in military power, new 
nuclear states generally produce more regional 
and international stability, not less…Power, 
after all, begs to be balanced.”12
Structural realism was not and is not the 
only approach to IR, of course.  Another prom-
inent approach, liberalism, emphasized the pos-
sibilities for harmony and cooperation between 
states facilitated through international orga-
nizations, institutions, and laws.  Disparaged 
during the interwar period as naively utopian 
and dangerously unrealistic (epitomized by the 
failure of the League of Nations to prevent 
WWII), liberalism saw a major resurgence in 
the 1960s and ’70s that was driven by interest 
in increasing economic ties between Western 
states, the growing importance of non-state ac-
tors (like NGOs and multinational companies), 
and the deepening political and economic in-
tegration among erstwhile enemies in Europe. 
This “new” liberalism (neoliberalism) argued 
that Western states existed in a condition of 
“complex interdependence” characterized by 
a web of economic, social, and other ties that 
diminished the importance of military security 
and the relevance of force as a policy option.13
But the forceful articulation of anarchy’s 
central importance in Theory of International 
Politics influenced even liberal writers. Rob-
ert Keohane — creator, with Joseph Nye, of 
the concept of complex interdependence — 
advanced a modified liberal argument in his 
influential 1984 After Hegemony that accepted 
structural realism’s key assumptions about 
anarchy, the centrality of states, and the role of 
power.14  But in contrast to realist arguments, 
he showed that cooperation among self-inter-
ested states is possible through international 
institutions or regimes (“sets of principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures” 
in a specific area like trade or aviation).15  Re-
alists argued that these kinds of cooperative 
arrangements are created by dominant powers 
to reinforce their own power and interests, 
but that in the absence of a hegemon, they 
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break down as security fears trump interest in 
cooperation.  Using both logic and historical 
evidence, Keohane argued that this pessimism 
wasn’t warranted.  Even after hegemony, re-
gimes persist because states find them useful in 
lowering the costs of negotiating, monitoring, 
and enforcing mutually beneficial agreements.
There were other critiques of Waltz’s struc-
tural realist theory, many of which attacked 
realism for an overly simplistic view of inter-
national politics that ignored other important 
actors and forces at work.  They were right, of 
course, but Waltz never argued that realism 
provides a complete picture of international 
relations.  Rather, he argued that theories are 
necessarily abstractions from reality, simpli-
fications “that lay bare the essential elements 
in play and indicate the necessary relations 
of cause and interdependency — or suggest 
where to look for them.”16  And as events in 
Ukraine have recently demonstrated, one of 
those “essential elements in play” is an anar-
chic international system where “the strong do 
what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must.”17  
Endnotes
1.  Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and 
War: A Theoretical Analysis, 2nd ed. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001.*
2.  Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of Inter-
national Politics. Reading, Mass: Addi-
son-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979.*
3.  Thucydides. The Landmark Thucydides: 
A Comprehensive Guide to the Pelopon-
nesian War, edited by Robert B. Strassler. 
Translated by Richard Crawley. New York: 
Free Press, 2008, Book I, par. 23, p. 16.*
4.  Man, the State, and War, 238.
5.  Ibid., 233.
6.  Theory of International Politics, 91.
7.  Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
7th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006.*
8.  Ibid., 4, 39.
9.  Ibid., 119.
10.  Theory of International Politics, 65.
11.  Waltz, Kenneth. “Why Iran Should Get 
the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs. 91.4 July/Au-




12.  Ibid.; For a more complete debate on nu-
clear proliferation, see Scott D. Sagan and 
Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3rd ed. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2013.*
13.  Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. 
Nye. Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. 
Boston: Longman, 2012.*
14.  Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Po-
litical Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2005.*
15.  Ibid., 59.
16.  Theory of International Politics, 10.
17.  The Landmark Thucydides, Book V, 
par. 89, 352.
*Editor’s note: An asterisk (*) denotes a title 
selected for Resources for College Libraries.
